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NOTES
WHO MAY WE DETAIN AND HOW: LESSONS
FROM POST 9/11 ENEMY COMBATANT
JURISPRUDENCE FOR NEW YORK’S CIVIL
COMMITMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS
SAMANTHA ALESSI †
INTRODUCTION
[T]he liberty secured by the Constitution of the United
States to every person within its jurisdiction does not
import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times
and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint.
There are manifold restraints to which every person is
necessarily subject for the common good. On any other
basis organized society could not exist with safety to its
members. 1
Theodore Sypnier, a 100-year-old man from New York, was
recently put behind bars for failing to comply with parole
conditions stemming from his sixty year history of molesting
children. 2 It was the second time he violated his parole. 3 His
youngest daughter has pleaded with local and state lawmakers to
civilly confine her father, despite his advanced age, because she
feels that he will almost certainly reoffend if he is out on the
streets. 4 Mr. Sypnier contends that he is too old for treatment. 5
†
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1
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356–57 (1997) (citing Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905)).
2
Lou Michel, 100-Year-Old Pedophile Sent Back to Jail, THE BUFFALO NEWS,
Jan. 26, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.buffalonews.com/incoming/article
31528.ece.
3

Id.

4

See id.

5

Id.
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However, a psychotherapist familiar with Mr. Sypnier’s case said
that “he will likely continue to present a risk to the community.
If he isn’t a candidate for civil confinement, I don’t know who is.” 6
Civil confinement 7 laws allow states to commit sex offenders
after their terms of incarceration are completed. 8 The decision to
civilly confine sex offenders occurs after they have served their
time in prison.
The Supreme Court has addressed the
constitutionality of civil confinement laws in two decisions
regarding a Kansas statute. 9 These cases established that
involuntary detention of dangerous mentally ill sex offenders is
constitutionally authorized, so long as due process requirements
are met. 10
New York recently passed its own civil confinement statute,
the Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act (“SOMTA”),
which closely resembles the Kansas statute. Although the
Supreme Court spoke directly on the civil confinement of sexual
offenders in the context of the Kansas statute, New York’s
similar civil confinement law has been attacked on constitutional
grounds. 11 Since the Supreme Court has stated that detention of
mentally ill and dangerous sex offenders is authorized and that
civil confinement statutes are facially valid, those challenging
the New York Act focus their objections on certain provisions
that they find to be procedurally deficient. 12 Litigants contend
that “specific aspects of the regime [that the Act] creates fail to
Id.
The terms “civil confinement” and “civil commitment” shall be used
interchangeably throughout this Note.
8
See Richard G. Wright, Sex Offender Post-Incarceration Sanctions: Are There
Any Limits?, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 17, 38–39 (2008)
(discussing the history and progression of civil commitment for sex offenders in the
United States).
9
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346
(1997); see also discussion infra Part I.C.
10
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356, 369–71 (holding that the civil confinement statute
did not violate substantive due process and rejecting the offender’s claims that the
Double Jeopardy Clause or ex post facto issues were implicated); see also infra Part
I.C.
11
See Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Spitzer, No. 07-Civ-2935, 2007 WL
4115936, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2007) (focusing on procedural, and not
substantive, due process), aff’d sub nom. Mental Hygiene Legal Servs. v. Paterson,
No. 07-Civ-5548, 2009 WL 579445 (2d Cir. Mar. 04, 2009). “Plaintiffs do not
challenge New York’s [ultimate] authority to involuntarily commit individuals who
have in the past committed sexual crimes and are at present mentally ill and
dangerous.” Id. at *6.
12
See id.
6
7
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provide the requisite procedural safeguards necessary to comport
with the constitutional command that persons may not be
deprived of liberty without due process of law.” 13 In other states,
legal challenges to civil confinement laws have been accompanied
by commentary and academic literature denouncing the
practice. 14 It is likely that the challenges in other states are
indicative of those that the New York Act will face. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court’s decision to hear challenges to the same civil
confinement statute twice within a five year period signifies the
controversial nature of the issue.
Although the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the
Kansas statute upheld the constitutionality of civil confinement,
this method of addressing the social problem of sex offenders
faces criticism. One of the concerns is that many states are using
the ambiguity of the decisions to ignore the Supreme Court’s
holding in crafting and upholding their civil commitment
statutes. 15 This Note proposes that another line of Supreme
Court jurisprudence, the decisions addressing enemy combatants
detained in Guantanamo Bay, provides a basis upon which the
New York civil confinement law can be analyzed. Additionally,
the Note offers a response to potential statutory challenges that
could not otherwise be formed from the civil confinement cases
alone.
After the September 11 attacks on the United States in 2001,
Congress quickly passed a resolution authorizing the President
to “use all necessary and appropriate force” against those
connected to the attacks. 16 The conflict that followed was, and
Id. at *1.
See generally Eric S. Janus, The Preventative State, Terrorists, and Sexual
Predators: Countering the Threat of a New Outsider Jurisprudence, 40 CRIM. L.
BULL. 576 (2004) (pointing out the dangers of civil confinement and negative
constitutional implications); Todd M. Grossman, Comment, Kansas v. Hendricks:
The Diminishing Role of Treatment in the Involuntary Civil Confinement of Sexually
Dangerous Persons, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 475 (1999) (suggesting that adequate
treatment is a necessary component of civil commitment); Allison Morgan, Note,
Civil Confinement of Sex Offenders: New York’s Attempt To Push the Envelope in the
Name of Public Safety, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1001 (2006) (discussing the possibility that
states are creating a group of second-class citizens with fewer rights than the rest of
us).
15
See Peter C. Pfaffenroth, Note, The Need for Coherence: States’ Civil
Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 STAN. L. REV.
2229, 2248–50 (2003).
16
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)).
13
14
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continues to be, an unconventional “war” on terror. When
individuals captured by the military were sent to Guantanamo
Bay, legal challenges to their detention arose. Starting in 2004,
and continuing until the present, the Supreme Court grappled
with the question of what protections should be afforded to these
individuals, termed “enemy combatants” by the Government. 17
This Note argues that the post 9/11 enemy combatant cases
are an appropriate lens through which to examine and ultimately
defend the constitutionality of New York’s civil confinement
statute. Although civilly confining sex offenders and detaining
enemy combatants are in part motivated by different concerns, it
has been argued that these “two powerful streams of
contemporary American public policy are converging on a single
idea”: identifying a dangerous class of persons and incapacitating
them in order to prevent them from doing future harm. 18 The
9/11 cases illustrate that above a constitutionally minimum
“floor” of due process requirements, which includes notice and
opportunity to be heard, the political branches are free to craft
procedures for detaining certain classes of individuals as they see
fit.
Three principles emerge with respect to both enemy
combatants detained by the United States military and sex
offenders civilly committed by the New York statute. These
principles are first suggested in the civil confinement cases, and
reinforced and clarified by the Guantanamo cases. First, it is
difficult to draw bright-line rules in both areas, and in the
absence of these rules, the political branches must draft
legislation that meets the constitutional minimums. Second, the
Court is willing to defer to these legislative judgments on how to
best craft methods to detain individuals, so long as established

The four relevant cases, in chronological order, are Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (holding that a United States citizen held as an “enemy
combatant [must] be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for
[his] detention”); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484–85 (2004) (establishing that
federal courts have jurisdiction to hear detention challenges from foreign nationals);
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 560 (2006) (finding that the military
commissions created by the Executive Branch violated the Uniform Code of Military
Justice and the Geneva Convention); and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798
(2008) (holding that aliens detained as enemy combatants were entitled to the
privilege of habeas corpus).
18
Janus, supra note 14, at 576.
17
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due process requirements are met. Finally, incapacitation for the
purpose of preventing future harm is a legitimate goal of
confinement in both instances.
Part I of this Note discusses the passage and provisions of
the New York Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act. It
also provides a brief discussion of the two Supreme Court cases
directly addressing civil confinement of sex offenders. Part II
analyzes how the 9/11 enemy combatant cases can be used to
determine the constitutionality of the New York statute. Part III
considers some actual and potential challenges to the New York
law, with responses drawn from the reasoning of the Supreme
Court’s detainee cases.
I.

CIVIL CONFINEMENT IN NEW YORK

This Part discusses the passage of New York’s civil
confinement law and includes a synopsis of the Act’s key
provisions. It also provides a brief summary and analysis of the
Supreme Court’s two recent civil confinement cases: Kansas v.
Hendricks 19 and Kansas v. Crane. 20
A.

New York Passes a Civil Confinement Statute for Sex
Offenders

New York’s civil confinement statute was the product of the
legislative branch’s struggle to take a tough stance against sex
offenders and the judiciary’s response to this goal. In 2005,
without a specific law in place to govern the procedure, Governor
Pataki unilaterally ordered that more than two-dozen sex
offenders with imminent release dates be committed using
current state laws. His actions were challenged: The former
prisoners who were involuntarily committed filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. 21
The case went up to the Court of Appeals, which gave a
“sharp rebuke” to the Governor and struck down the
confinements. 22 In State ex rel. Harkavy v. Consilvio, 23 the
521 U.S. 346 (1997).
534 U.S. 407 (2002).
21
See State ex rel. Harkavy v. Consilvio, 10 Misc. 3d 851, 858, 809 N.Y.S.2d 836,
841 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2005) (granting petition in part).
22
See Nicholas Confessore, Court Rebukes Pataki on Confining Sex Offenders
After Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2006, at B1.
23
7 N.Y.3d 607, 859 N.E.2d 508, 825 N.Y.S.2d 702 (2006).
19
20
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unanimous court held that Pataki’s use of existing mental
hygiene laws was improper, because the offenders were in the
custody of the state’s Department of Correctional Services at the
time. 24 The court found that in “the absence of specific statutory
authority governing the release of felony offenders from prison to
a psychiatric hospital,” the corrections law should have been
followed. 25 In striking down Pataki’s confinements, the court
recognized that he had acted “in an attempt to protect the
community from violent sexual predators,” and the judges did
“not propose that these petitioners be released.” 26 The court also
noted that it did not want “to trump the interests of public
safety.” 27 The opinion almost reads as an instruction to the
legislature: If you want to do this, then pass a law. New York
legislators responded, and on April 13, 2007, they passed The Sex
Offender Management and Treatment Act. 28 The Act was passed
as “a balanced response to a compelling need.” 29 The compelling
need identified was “to protect [New York] residents . . . from sex
criminals whose recidivism is predictable and uncontrollable.” 30
Balanced against this compelling need were due process
concerns, which require, at a minimum, notice and opportunity to
be heard. The following section describes the procedures put in
place by SOMTA in order to realize these requirements.
B. The Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act
In passing the Act, the legislature found that recidivistic sex
offenders posed a danger to society that had thus far been
inadequately addressed through the existing criminal
framework. 31 The legislative findings repeatedly emphasized
that the Act was designed for both treatment of the offenders and

Id. at 610, 859 N.E.2d at 509, 825 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
Id.
26
Id. at 614, 859 N.E.2d at 512, 825 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
27
Id. (also “recogniz[ing] that a need for continued hospitalization may well
exist”).
28
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.01 (McKinney 2010).
29
Introducer’s Memorandum in Support, Bill Jacket, ch. 7, L. 2007, 2007 S.B.
3318 (Westlaw).
30
Id.
31
See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.01(a).
24
25

CP_Alessi (Do Not Delete)

2011]

7/14/2011 3:56 PM

WHO MAY WE DETAIN AND HOW

237

for the protection of the community. 32 This Section identifies the
key provisions of SOMTA and describes the three step process for
civil confinement in New York.
1.

Sex Offenders Affected by SOMTA

The Act creates two classes of offenders: those who are to be
physically confined and those who are to be subject to strict
supervision. It provides that individuals who pose a greater
threat to society will be detained in secure facilities, while those
who are capable of living in the community will be monitored
under a system of strict supervision. The general “sex offender
requiring civil management” is a detained sex offender who
suffers from a mental abnormality. 33 In New York, a “mental
abnormality” denotes
“a congenital or acquired condition,
disease or disorder that affects the emotional, cognitive, or
volitional capacity of a person in a manner that predisposes him
or her to the commission of conduct constituting a sex offense and
that results in that person having serious difficulty in controlling
such conduct.” 34 Whereas a
“[d]angerous sex offender requiring confinement” means a
person who is a detained sex offender suffering from a mental
abnormality involving such a strong predisposition to commit
sex offenses, and such an inability to control behavior, that the
person is likely to be a danger to others and to commit sex
offenses if not confined to a secure treatment facility. 35

32
See generally id. § 10.01. The integrated approach should “provide meaningful
treatment and . . . protect the public.” Id. § 10.01(a). Confinement should be
extended by the civil process to provide the offender with treatment and “protect the
public from [the offender’s] recidivistic conduct.” Id. § 10.01(b). The goal should be
to “protect the public, reduce recidivism, and ensure offenders have access to proper
treatment.” Id. § 10.01(c). The system “must be designed for treatment and
protection.” Id. § 10.01(e).
33
Id. § 10.03(q).
34
Id. § 10.03(i).
35
Id. § 10.03(e). There are currently two secure facilities for sex offenders in
New York: Central New York Psychiatric Center, near Utica, and St. Lawrence
Psychiatric Center, near Ogdensburg. See OFF. N.Y. ST. ATT’Y GEN., THE SEX
OFFENDER MANAGEMENT AND TREATMENT ACT: THE FIRST YEAR: A REPORT ON THE
2007 LAW THAT ESTABLISHED CIVIL MANAGEMENT FOR SEX OFFENDERS, at 8,
[hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT], available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/
bureaus/sexual_offender/pdfs/April%202008%20Yearly%20Report.pdf.
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An offender who requires strict supervision36 also suffers from a
mental abnormality but does not require confinement because it
has been decided that he can live safely in the community. 37 If
the offender violates the conditions of his supervision, he may be
placed in a secure treatment facility. 38
2.

The Civil Confinement Process in New York

To ensure procedural protections, the civil confinement
process under the Act takes place in three stages: a review of the
case, a probable cause hearing before a judge, and a trial before a
jury. 39 Complex “safeguards are necessary to ensure that the
respondent’s legal rights are respected and that decisions to
civilly manage individuals withstand legal scrutiny.” 40
The first stage of the process begins when any detained sex
offender is nearing the end of his incarceration; at this time,
notice is given to the Attorney General’s Office. 41 The case is
then referred to the Office of Mental Health (“OMH”). OMH is
responsible for reviewing every case and making a
recommendation. 42 The case review panel, located within OMH,
must consist of at least fifteen members, and each case should be
reviewed by three members. 43 The Act requires that “[a]t least
two members of each team shall be professionals in the field of

36
“Strict and Intensive Supervision and Treatment” is intended for offenders
“who can, with supervision and support, live safely in the community.” ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 35, at 7. It is supervised by parole officers with a
case ratio of ten to one—a normal caseload in the state is sixty to one, and a normal
sex offender caseload is twenty-five to one. Id. Offenders are also required to have
six face-to-face contacts and six collateral contacts each month. Id. Other conditions
imposed specifically relate to the offenders risk factors and prior behavior: for
example, that he may not have contact with minors, or he may not use a computer.
Id. Offenders are also required to attend treatment sessions and are subject to drug
testing and polygraph examinations. Id.
37
See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03(r) (McKinney 2010).
38
See id. § 10.11(d)(1) (stating that the parole officer must have “reasonable
cause to believe that the person has violated a condition”).
39
See id. §§ 10.05–.07.
40
See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 35, at 5.
41
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.05(b). Although the Act states that notice shall
be given to the Attorney General “at least one hundred twenty days prior to the
person’s anticipated release,” it also maintains that failure to give notice within the
prescribed time period “shall not affect the validity of such notice or any subsequent
action.” Id.
42
See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 35, at 4.
43
See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.05(a).
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mental health.” 44 The case team is responsible for looking over
medical, clinical, criminal, or institutional records, as well as
actuarial risk assessment instruments and reports provided by
the district attorney. 45 If the team finds that the offender is a sex
offender requiring civil management, the case is referred to the
Attorney General for litigation. 46 In the first year, 139 of the
1,603 cases reviewed by OMH were referred to the Attorney
General. 47
The second stage of the process is a petition and hearing
before a judge. 48 At any time prior to the trial, the Attorney
General may request a court order that the respondent submit to
a psychiatric evaluation performed by an examiner of the State’s
choosing. 49 In addition, the respondent may obtain an evaluation
by a psychiatrist of his own choosing. 50 At the hearing, the judge
must determine “whether there is probable cause to believe that
the respondent is a sex offender requiring civil management.”51
At the hearing, the offender’s prior commission of a sex offense is
deemed established and will not be relitigated, even if he was
found not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect, or
was incompetent to stand trial. 52 If the court determines that
there is probable cause to believe that the respondent is a sex
offender requiring civil management, he remains in the custody
of the state and a date is set for a jury trial. 53

Id.
See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.05(d). The offender’s file is first reviewed by
a multidisciplinary staff, who may then refer it to a case review team. In the first
year 1,603 detained offenders were reviewed by the staff. Of these, 274 went on to a
case review team. Out of the 274, 139 were ultimately referred to the Attorney
General for litigation. See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 35.
46
The Act requires that the case review team provide its referral to the Attorney
General within forty-five days of receiving the notice of the offender’s anticipated
release, but again, the failure to do so within the appropriate time period does not
affect the continuation of the process. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.05(g).
47
See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 35.
48
See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.06. The attorney general should “seek to file
the petition within thirty days after receiving notice of the case review team’s
finding.” Id. § 10.06(a).
49
Id. § 10.06(d).
50
Id. § 10.06(e).
51
Id. § 10.06(g). A “sex offender requiring civil management . . . is a detained
sex offender who suffers from a mental abnormality.” See id. § 10.03(q).
52
Id. § 10.06(j).
53
Id. § 10.06(k).
44
45

CP_Alessi (Do Not Delete)

240

7/14/2011 3:56 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:231

The third and final step of the process is a jury trial, in the
same court that conducted the probable cause hearing. 54 The
purpose of the trial is to “determine whether the respondent is a
detained sex offender who suffers from a mental abnormality.”55
Unlike the probable cause hearing, at trial, the jury must make
this determination “by clear and convincing evidence,” and the
Attorney General litigating the case has the burden of proof. 56
If the jury finds that the respondent requires civil
management, the court must then decide whether he must be
confined or put under strict and intensive supervision. He will be
confined only if there is clear and convincing evidence that:
(1) his mental abnormality involves a strong predisposition to
commit sex offenses; (2) he has an inability to control his
behavior; and (3) that he is likely to be a danger to others if not
confined. 57 If the court does not find that he must be committed,
he will be placed under strict and intensive supervision. 58 After
an offender has been committed, he receives an annual
examination. Each year, a psychiatrist evaluates him and
reports on whether he is still a dangerous sex offender requiring
confinement. 59 The offender may also petition for discharge at
any time.
C. The Supreme Court’s Perspective on Civil Confinement of Sex
Offenders
The United States Supreme Court has specifically addressed
civil confinement of sex offenders in two cases. The Court’s
analysis in these cases highlights that civil confinement laws are
facially valid, but certain procedures and provisions may be
addressed through as-applied challenges.
This Section

Id. § 10.07(a) (stating that the trial will occur within sixty days of the
probable cause hearing).
55
Id.
56
Id. § 10.07(d). This determination must be made by a unanimous jury. Id.
57
See id. § 10.07(f). “In such case, the respondent shall be committed to a secure
treatment facility for care, treatment, and control until such time as he or she no
longer requires confinement.” Id.
58
See id. “Strict and intensive supervision” is governed by section 10.11 of the
Act. Possible requirements include electronic monitoring, global positioning satellite
tracking, polygraph monitoring, residence restrictions, prohibition of contact with
past or potential victims, and supervision by a parole officer. See id. § 10.11(a)(1); see
also supra note 34 and accompanying text.
59
See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.09(b) (McKinney 2010).
54
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summarizes both of the Court’s civil confinement decisions
regarding the Kansas statute, which is similar to the New York
Act.
1.

Kansas v. Hendricks

In Kansas v. Hendricks, 60 the Supreme Court held that
Kansas’s Sexually Violent Predator Act 61 satisfied substantive
due process requirements for civil confinement. 62 Kansas used
the statute for the first time to commit Hendricks, who had a
Hendricks
long criminal history of molesting children. 63
appealed his commitment, and the supreme court in the state of
Kansas held the Act violated his substantive due process rights,
because the Act’s definition of “mental illness” did not satisfy the
United States Supreme Court’s “mental illness” requirement for
involuntary commitment. 64 The United States Supreme Court
disagreed, finding that the Act did “comport[ ] with due process
requirements.” 65
In holding the Act constitutional, the Court noted that
although individual freedom from personal restraint is a core
liberty protected by due process, “that liberty interest is not
States, in narrow circumstances, may forcibly
absolute.” 66
Civil
commit individuals who pose a danger to society. 67
confinement of a small subclass of dangerous persons is not
“contrary to our understanding of ordered liberty.” 68 The Court
did not elaborate on what would be considered an adequate
procedure to forcibly commit a dangerous individual.
The Court also noted that the Act was civil in nature,
rejecting Hendricks’ argument that it established criminal
proceedings. It stated that “[t]he categorization of a particular
521 U.S. 346 (1997).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (2008).
62
See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997).
63
See id. at 350.
64
See id. at 356 (the majority of the Kansas Supreme Court did not address
Hendricks’ double jeopardy or ex post facto claims).
65
Id. at 371.
66
Id. at 356. The Court quoted an earlier case, which warned that “[t]here are
manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common
good. On any other basis organized society could not exist with safety to its
members.” Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905).
67
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357 (explaining that the individual’s liberty interest
may be overridden even in the civil context).
68
Id.
60
61
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proceeding as civil or criminal is first of all a question of
statutory construction. . . .
[Once w]e ascertain [that] the
legislature meant the statute to establish ‘civil’ proceedings
[then] we ordinarily defer to the legislature’s stated intent.” 69
Although the Court recognized that incapacitation was a goal of
the Act, it noted that “the mere fact that a person is detained
does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government
has imposed punishment.” 70 Here, the Court decided that the
confinement at issue was not punitive in nature but was instead
intended simply to “hold the person until his mental abnormality
no longer causes him to be a threat to others.” 71 The Court also
found that even though there was no adequate treatment
provision in the Act, “incapacitation [alone] may be a legitimate
end of the civil law.” 72
2.

Kansas v. Crane

Perhaps indicating the uncertainty surrounding the
Hendricks decision, the same Kansas statute was revisited by the
Supreme Court five years later in Kansas v. Crane. 73 The Court
once again evaluated the constitutionality of the state’s civil
commitment law. The issue presented this time was more
narrow: In order for the statute to comport with substantive due
process, did Hendricks require that the sex offender exhibit total
or complete lack of control over his behavior? 74 The Kansas
Supreme Court found that under Hendricks, the Constitution
requires that the subject be completely unable to control his
behavior. 75 The State of Kansas disagreed, arguing that the
Id. at 361 (internal quotation marks omitted). This deference to the judgment
of the legislature will be discussed further Part II below, in the context of the
detainees at Guantanamo Bay.
70
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
746 (1987)).
71
Id. (“This is a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective and has been
historically so regarded.”). For a further discussion of the importance of
incapacitation as a preventative measure see infra Part II.B.
72
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 365–66.
73
534 U.S. 407 (2002).
74
Id. at 411.
75
In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 290 (Kan. 2000).
A fair reading of the majority opinion in Hendricks leads us to the
inescapable conclusion that commitment under the Act is unconstitutional
absent a finding that the defendant cannot control his dangerous behavior.
To conclude otherwise would require that we ignore the plain language of
the majority opinion in Hendricks. Justice Thomas, speaking for the
69
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Constitution does not require any lack of control determination
in order to civilly commit an offender. 76 The United States
Supreme Court split the difference and concluded that under its
previous decision in Hendricks, and consistent with the
Constitution, a person could be committed under the Kansas
statute with “proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior.” 77
In addition, the Court suggested that “the Constitution’s
safeguards of human liberty in the area of mental illness and the
law are not always best enforced through precise bright-line
rules.” 78 The Court emphasized that individual states retain
“considerable leeway” in defining who is eligible for civil
commitment due to mental abnormalities. 79
An analysis of the two civil confinement decisions
demonstrates a few key points, each of which will be examined
further in this Note. First, the Court is willing to allow states to
craft their civil confinement statutes as their legislatures see fit.
It states in definite terms that it will normally defer to the
legislature in this area of the law, so long as the civil
confinement statute meets basic due process requirements.
Second, the Court recognizes that it is difficult to draw brightline rules with regard to due process and civil confinement of sex
offenders. In the absence of these rules, it is necessary for states
to ensure that they draft legislation that meets the minimum
constitutional protections of due process. Third, the Court
identifies incapacitation for the purpose of preventing future
harm as a legitimate goal of civil confinement. Each of these
principles can be better illustrated when examined through the
lens of the Guantanamo Bay detainee cases.

majority, stated that to be constitutional, a civil commitment must limit
involuntary confinement to those “who suffer from a volitional impairment
rendering them dangerous beyond their control.”
Id. (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358 (1997)). The Kansas court interpreted this
language from Hendricks as requiring a complete or total lack of control. Id. at 288–
89.
76
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002) (citing the Brief for Petitioner at
17, Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) (No. 00-957), 2001 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS
390; Transcript of Oral Argument at 30–31, Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002)
(No. 00-957), 2001 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 58).
77
Id. at 413.
78
Id.
79
Id.
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II. HOW THE POST 9/11 DETAINEE CASES INFORM CIVIL
CONFINEMENT
The enemy combatant cases are relevant for analyzing New
York’s civil confinement statute, due to similarities in the
problems both seek to address, the related solutions crafted, and
the comparable discourse between the judicial and political
branches. The Court’s enemy combatant decisions highlight
what is insufficient for purposes of due process: This Note
proposes that if these deficiencies are not implicated by the New
York statute, it follows that it is adequate for due process
purposes. This Part first briefly discusses the process of how sex
offenders and enemy combatants arrive in their respective
detentions. It then notes the emphasis on prevention as a
legitimate goal of incapacitation in both scenarios. Finally, it
sketches out how the minimum protections of due process can be
met through a procedure specially tailored by the Executive or
the legislature in certain circumstances.
A.

How Do Sex Offenders and Enemy Combatant Detainees “Get
There?”

Kansas v. Crane was decided in 2002, after September 11 but
before the first Guantanamo Bay detainee case 80 came before the
Court. The Guantanamo cases are relevant for analysis of the
New York statute, because although the Court addressed the
Kansas statute in its civil confinement cases, it did not spell out
exactly what a statute must avoid to be considered constitutional.
Rather, it spoke in terms of why the Kansas statute was
constitutional.
With the New York civil confinement statute, there is a
clearly defined path for how the offender “gets there”: He has
been convicted of at least one designated offense in the past, 81
been incarcerated and close to release, and then been deemed to
have a mental abnormality. After these conditions are met, and
he goes through the civil commitment process, he is deemed a
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) and Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466
(2004) were both decided on June 28, 2004.
81
“[I]n order for a valid sex offender civil management petition to be filed, a
respondent must have been convicted of committing a defined sex offense.” State v.
P.H., 22 Misc. 3d 689, 705, 874 N.Y.S.2d 733, 745 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (finding that
respondent was previously convicted of attempted rape in the first degree and sexual
abuse in the first degree, two qualifying offenses under the Act).
80
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“sex offender requiring civil management.” 82 With the detainees
at Guantanamo, it is slightly more ambiguous, but the general
path toward being detained is a capture on the “battlefield” and
the government’s designation of the individual as an “enemy
combatant.” 83
B. The Importance of Prevention in Both Schemes
Both civil confinement laws and enemy combatant policies
seek to prevent future harm to society by incapacitating
dangerous individuals. One of the recurring themes of the New
York civil confinement statute is the need to prevent sex
offenders from harming the community in the future. The first
sentence of the legislative findings states that “recidivistic sex
offenders pose a danger to society that should be addressed
through
comprehensive
programs
of
treatment
and
management.” 84 The idea of protecting the public by addressing
the risk of sex offenders comes up five more times in the next
four sections of the Act: “[C]onfinement of the most dangerous
offenders will need to be extended by the civil process in order to
provide them [with] treatment and to protect the public from
their recidivist conduct.” 85 The Attorney General has said that
82
See generally N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.01 (McKinney 2010); see also supra
Part I.B.
83
There is no definitive or exclusive definition of an “enemy combatant.”
However, in a 2004 order establishing the military teams to review detainees, it was
stated that “[f]or purposes of this Order, the term ‘enemy combatant’ shall mean an
individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated
forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition
partners.” Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of
the Navy (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/jul2004/
d20040707review.pdf. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court pointed out that,
[t]here is some debate as to the proper scope of this term, and the
Government has never provided any court with the full criteria that is uses
in classifying individuals as such. It has made clear, however, that, for
purposes of this case, the “enemy combatant” that it is seeking to detain is
an individual who, it alleges, was “ ‘part of or supporting forces hostile to
the United States or coalition partners’ ” in Afghanistan and who
“ ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States’ ” there.
542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004) (quoting Brief for the Respondents at 3, Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 724020).
84
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.01(a).
85
Id. § 10.01(b); see also id. (“These offenders may require long-term specialized
treatment modalities to address their risk to reoffend.”); id. § 10.01(c) (“The goal of a
comprehensive system should be to protect the public, [and] reduce recidivism . . . .”);
id. § 10.01(d) (noting protection of society as a goal of civil commitment); id.
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the system is designed to “closely supervise and treat” offenders
who “pose a substantial risk to commit new sex crimes.” 86 The
Attorney General also notes that civil management “enhances
public safety by filling a void” 87 and provides “a new mechanism
to protect New Yorkers from mentally abnormal and potentially
dangerous sex offenders.” 88
The Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of
prevention in its enemy combatant cases, and its analysis
supports New York’s stated goals in passing its civil confinement
law. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a plurality of the Court considered
the government’s interest in detaining enemy combatants. 89 It
found that the government’s concern in making sure enemies do
not return to battle is “weighty and sensitive.” 90 The Court
willingly conceded that the Constitution allows for decisions
concerning war to be made by those who are “best positioned and
most politically accountable for making them.” 91 The Court’s due
process analysis “need not blink at those realities.” 92
In his Boumediene v. Bush dissent, Justice Scalia
emphasized a legitimate goal of confining enemy combatants at
Guantanamo. 93 His discussion is constructive in the context of
civil commitment when he stresses the importance of prevention
in detaining enemy combatants, because many of the reasons
that justify detaining enemy combatants also justify confining
sexual predators. Both groups are dangerous to society, it is
difficult to predict the future behavior of each, and incapacitating
these individuals seems to be the only practical way to protect
potential victims.
Justice Scalia notes the “disastrous
consequences” stemming from the Court’s holding that detained
alien enemy combatants have a right to the writ of habeas corpus
and states his fundamental disagreement with the proposition
that the writ runs in favor of aliens abroad. 94 He then goes on to
§ 10.01(e) (“That the system for responding to recidivistic sex offenders with civil
measures must be designed for . . . protection.”).
86
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 35, at 1.
87
Id. at 3.
88
Id. at 12 (concluding that after a year of being implemented, SOMTA has
made New York communities “safer”).
89
542 U.S. 507 (2004).
90
Id. at 531.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 827 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94
Id.
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emphasize a point important for the civil confinement issue:
there is no real way of knowing if an enemy combatant will
reoffend once released. 95 Some enemy combatants released from
Guantanamo “succeeded in carrying on their atrocities against
innocent civilians.” 96 This “return to the kill illustrates the
incredible difficulty of assessing who is and who is not an enemy
combatant . . . .” 97
Despite the attempt to craft a stringent standard for civilly
committing sex offenders in New York, it, too, is a fallible
process. In the end, it comes down to the judgment of mental
health professionals, judges, and juries. However, despite the
inherent difficulties in predicting who will reoffend, the
legislature has chosen to pursue civil confinement as a means of
preventing future crimes. Just as the military does not want
enemy combatants returning to engage in more hostilities
against American forces, New York does not want convicted sex
offenders returning to society to commit more crimes. It can be
argued that this “impulse for prevention” is implicated by the
“ongoing legislative innovations in the campaign against sexual
violence.” 98
New York courts have also noted the importance of
prevention in the context of civil commitment. The Court of
Appeals recognized the legislature’s goal of “protect[ing] the
community from violent sexual predators.” 99 In a presently
ongoing federal case involving procedural due process challenges
to SOMTA, it was noted that “New York . . . has a strong interest
in ensuring the safety of potential victims of [sexual] offenses.” 100
Coupled with the legislature’s stated intent of using civil
confinement as a means of protecting society, it is evident that
the judiciary in New York recognizes prevention as a legitimate
goal of civil confinement.

Id. at 826.
Id. at 828.
97
Id. at 829.
98
Janus, supra note 14, at 576.
99
State ex rel. Harkavy v. Consilvio, 7 N.Y.3d 607, 614, 859 N.E.2d 508, 512,
825 N.Y.S.2d 702, 706 (2006).
100
Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Spitzer, No. 07-Civ-2935, 2007 WL 4115936,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2007) (discussing Plaintiff Mental Hygiene Legal Service’s
motion for injunctive relief), aff’d sub nom. Mental Hygiene Legal Servs. v. Paterson,
No. 07-Civ-5548, 2009 WL 579445 (2d Cir. 2009).
95
96
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C. How Can the Minimal Protections of Due Process Be Tailored
for Civil Confinement?
In responding to constitutional challenges to SOMTA, the
federal court in Mental Hygiene Legal Service v. Spitzer 101 stated
that “[w]hen a person’s liberty interests are implicated, due
process requires at a minimum notice and an opportunity to be
However, beyond this minimum “floor” of
heard.” 102
constitutional protection, “[d]ue process is not a fixed concept,
but flexible, and depends on the particular circumstances.” 103
The court also recited the traditional two-step inquiry for
examining a due process claim: first, whether there is a liberty
interest that has been interfered with by the State, and, second,
whether “the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were
constitutionally sufficient.” 104 In the case of civil confinement,
“there is no question” as to the first inquiry—persons affected by
the Act face a serious liberty deprivation: Those found to be sex
offenders requiring civil management are confined against their
will. 105 The remaining question is whether the procedures
created by the Act are constitutionally sufficient.
The Supreme Court has said that procedural due process
requirements may be tailored to fit exceptional circumstances.
In Hamdi, a Guantanamo case, a plurality of the Court held that
a United States citizen being held within United States territory
101
In New York, the Mental Hygiene Legal Service is placed within the judicial
branch of the government. It is responsible for protecting the rights of the mentally
disabled and advocating for individuals regarding the status of their mental health.
See Mental Hygiene Legal Service, NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM,
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ad4/MHLS/MHLS_default.htm (last visited Mar. 17,
2011).
102
Mental Hygiene Legal Serv., 2007 WL 4115936, at *5. It should be noted for
purposes of this discussion that the District Court in New York pulled this
particular phrasing of the due process minimum from Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, which
stated that
the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: Parties
whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that
they may enjoy that right they must first be notified. It is equally
fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard must
be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
103
Mental Hygiene Legal Serv., 2007 WL 4115936, at *4 (citing Zinermon v.
Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990)).
104
Id. (quoting Ky. Dep’t. of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)).
105
Id. (“Persons affected by Article 10 are threatened with deprivation not
merely of a liberty interest, but of liberty tout court . . . .”).
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should receive notice of the government’s factual basis for
holding him and an opportunity to contest that basis before an
impartial judge. 106 Just as with civil confinement, the Court
found that the private liberty interest affected by the official
action was “the most elemental of liberty interests—the interest
in being free from physical detention by one’s own
government.” 107 The Court concluded that the government may
not hold a citizen indefinitely without basic due process
protections enforceable through judicial review. 108
Beyond these basic due process protections, the plurality
found that “the exigencies of the circumstances may demand
that, aside from these core elements, enemy-combatant
proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon
potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military
conflict.” 109 The Court elaborated on general principles that
should guide the executive in crafting these “tailored”
procedures. First, hearsay might have to be accepted as a
reliable form of evidence from the government. 110 In addition,
the “Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in
favor of the Government’s evidence,” as long as there was a fair
opportunity for the detainee to rebut that presumption. 111 Once
the government puts forth credible evidence, the burden could
shift to the detainee to challenge with “more persuasive evidence
that he falls outside the [enemy combatant] criteria.” 112 The
plurality thought it was possible that these standards could be
met by a “properly constituted military tribunal.” 113 However, in

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509.
Id. at 529 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
108
Id. at 533. The plurality also pointed out that a “clearly established principle
of the law of war” is that detention may last no longer than hostilities. Id. at 519.
However, due to the nature of the “war on terror,” Hamdi’s detention “could last for
the rest of his life.” Id. at 520. This concern has been raised, albeit in a different
context, with civil confinement of sex offenders. See infra Part III.C.
109
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533 (emphasis added).
110
Id. at 533–34.
111
Id. at 534.
112
Id. This type of burden shifting would ensure that the “errant tourist,
embedded journalist, or local aid worker” is able to prove military error but still
gives “due regard to the Executive.” Id.
113
Id. at 538.
106
107
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crafting an alternative to established habeas procedures, 114
Congress will ultimately be told by the Court what is “good
enough” to be an adequate substitution.
Similarly, with the New York civil confinement statute, the
judiciary will be the final arbiter on whether the procedures are
“good enough.” In evaluating the constitutionality of the newly
enacted statute, a federal district court suggested that “it is
preferable to give the New York State courts the opportunity to
determine the proper scope of a New York law before a federal
court declares whether it offends the federal Constitution.” 115
The federal court also noted the role of judicial restraint in
evaluating a statute passed by the legislature:
If it is
“conceivable that the statute may be susceptible to constitutional
application,” the court will be hesitant to invalidate it on a facial
level. 116 Chief Justice Roberts echoed this preference for a
restrained judicial role in his Boumediene dissent. He chided the
majority that “we ought not to pass on questions of
constitutionality . . . unless such [questions are] unavoidable.” 117
Much of the Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding enemy
combatants has been marked by a back and forth with the
political branches. In Boumediene, the Court deferred to the
legislature when it considered the legislative history of enemy
combatant statutes. It found that “this ongoing dialogue between
and among the branches of Government . . . [should] be
respected.” 118 This parallels the “dialogue” between the New
York government and the Court of Appeals leading up to the
passage of SOMTA. 119 In each instance, the judiciary and the
government are involved in a “conversation”: the legislature
initiates it with a law, the court responds with an opinion.
114
The federal habeas statute states that “Writs of habeas corpus may be
granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006 & Supp. II).
115
Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Spitzer, No. 07-Civ-2935, 2007 WL 4115936,
at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2007) (“Depending upon how New York courts interpret
their own statute, there may be no need to reach any federal constitutional issue.”),
aff’d sub nom. Mental Hygiene Legal Servs. v. Paterson, No. 07-Civ-5548, 2009 WL
579445 (2d Cir. 2009).
116
Id. at *10–11.
117
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 805 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(alteration in original) (quoting Spector Motor Serv. Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S.
101, 105 (1944).
118
Id. at 738 (majority opinion).
119
See supra Part I.A.
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Depending on the court’s response, the legislature may have to
amend the law. Despite the government’s power to start the
dialogue, the judiciary has the final say in the conversation.
III. CHALLENGES TO CIVIL CONFINEMENT AND DETAINEE
RESPONSES
This Part summarizes a few of the actual and potential
challenges to New York’s civil confinement statute. The actual
challenges are those currently being raised through litigation;
potential challenges are informed by the experiences of other
states and the commentary criticizing civil commitment statutes
generally.
A.

Non-Judicial Determinations and Deficient Evidence
Standards

One challenge to New York’s statute might be that a nonjudicial body, the case review team from OMH, exercises power
over the confinement decision. Using the enemy combatant
cases, the appropriate response is that since that decision is
reviewed by both a judge and a jury, due process requirements
are met. In both civil confinement and enemy combatant
proceedings, a non-judicial body has authority over the detention
decision. With civil confinement, the OMH and a case review
team provide the initial review of the respondent’s file. There
must be a panel of at least fifteen members, at least three of
whom must evaluate each case. Two members must be mental
health professionals with experience in the treatment, diagnosis,
risk assessment, or management of sex offenders. 120 With
SOMTA, the case review team is the first step in the chain. Its
recommendation is ultimately considered by both a judge in the
probable cause hearing and a jury in the trial.
The parallel non-judicial body in enemy combatant cases is
the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (“CSRT”). CSRTs are
composed of three members of the military, none of whom was
involved in the apprehension of the detainee. 121 The Supreme
Court’s most recent detainee case did not explicitly endorse or

See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.05(a) (McKinney 2010).
See Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of
the Navy (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/jul2004/
d20040707review.pdf.
120
121
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reject the CSRTs. 122
Although it held that the Detainee
Treatment Act (“DTA”) passed by Congress was an inadequate
substitute for habeas, it did not “endeavor to offer a
comprehensive summary of the requisites” of a sufficient
procedure. 123 The Court expressly made “no judgment [as to]
whether the CSRTs, as currently constituted, satisfy due process
standards.” 124 It did, however, identify some deficiencies. First,
it noted that it was difficult for the detainee to rebut the factual
basis for the Government’s assertion that he was an enemy
combatant. 125 He was allowed to present “reasonably available
evidence,” but his ability was limited by his confinement. 126
Next, he was not permitted the assistance of counsel 127 but rather
had a “personal representative.” 128 The Court backpedaled from
its Hamdi suggestion that hearsay evidence is acceptable in this
context and found that the admission of hearsay makes the
“detainee’s
opportunity
to
question
witnesses . . . more
129
theoretical than real.”
Since the Court did not offer its view of what would
constitute an adequate habeas procedure in Boumediene, the
political branches were left to deduce what it requires. However,
it is logical to assume that if the aforementioned deficiencies
make the DTA inadequate, the inclusion of these safeguards
would make the procedure adequate.
Provisions of SOMTA state that the Attorney General has
the burden of showing that the respondent requires confinement,
and the respondent is allowed to contest the factual basis of the
state’s assertion at the trial. 130 He may employ his own

122
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 785 (2008) (holding that non-citizen
detainees had the right to the writ of habeas corpus).
123
Id. at 779.
124
Id. at 785.
125
See id. at 767.
126
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
127
Id. at 783–84.
128
A personal representative is a designated military officer with appropriate
security clearance who assists the detainee with the review process. See
Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of the Navy
(July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/jul2004/d20040707review.
pdf. The representative may share information with the detainee unless it is
classified. Id.
129
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 784.
130
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.07(d) (Mckinney 2010).
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psychiatric evaluator. 131 Additionally, at all stages of the process,
he is represented by counsel.
The DTA deficiencies of
Boumediene are not present with SOMTA.
Finally, in the New York civil confinement statute, the case
review team does the initial review and does not make a final
decision. A judicial body ultimately reviews its recommendation.
In Rasul v. Bush, 132 the Court went through a lengthy discussion
of habeas corpus and came to the conclusion that “the federal
courts have jurisdiction to determine the legality of the
Executive’s potentially indefinite detention of individuals who
claim to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing.” 133 After this
decision, the judiciary was able to exercise control over enemy
combatant determinations, just as a judicial body has authority
over the OMH civil confinement recommendation.
B. These Are Criminal Procedures Couched in Civil Terms
Another potential challenge to the New York statute is that
it couches criminal provisions in civil terms. Civil confinement
law has been criticized as being “a criminal wolf in a civil sheep’s
clothing.” 134 It has been argued that overly broad statutes “blur
the distinction between civil and criminal proceedings.” 135 The
response from the detainee cases is that in order to promote
safety, procedures may be tailored, and the judiciary will defer to
the legislature’s judgment so long as the statute may be
construed constitutionally. In Hendricks, the Supreme Court
rejected the argument that the Kansas civil confinement statute
was criminal in nature. 136 In New York, there have been
challenges to the Act that raise the question of whether certain
provisions are more criminal than civil. In responding to one of
these challenges, a district court judge found that the criminal
tone of the statute necessitated a closer look at one of its

Id. § 10.09(b).
542 U.S. 466 (2004).
133
Id. at 485.
134
Steven I. Friedland, On Treatment, Punishment and the Civil Confinement of
Sex Offenders, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 73, 115 (1999).
135
See Pfaffenroth, supra note 15, at 2251 (proposing that civil commitment
justifications create a “slippery slope” that might be used to allow confinement of
other types of criminals).
136
See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997).
131
132

CP_Alessi (Do Not Delete)

254

7/14/2011 3:56 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:231

provisions. 137 Section 10.07(d) authorizes civil confinement of
individuals who were charged with sex offenses but were unable
to stand trial, due to mental incapacitation. At the civil
commitment trial, if the Attorney General can prove by “clear
and convincing evidence . . . that respondent did engage in the
conduct constituting [the sex] offense,” he can be committed.138
The court noted the Hendricks proposition that a legislature’s
assertion that the statute is civil in nature may be overcome only
when it is clear that it is punitive either in nature or effect.
Here, the court found that the wording 139 and purpose of the
statute necessitated a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the
individual had actually committed the qualifying sex offense. 140
The enemy combatant proceedings are concerned with
criminal acts and penalties. However, Hamdi provides crucial
guidance in its proposition that the judiciary should defer to the
legislature to craft procedures as they see fit, so long as the
procedures meet the minimum due process requirements, in
either the civil or criminal contexts. As discussed earlier, the
Hamdi plurality found that the executive could tailor the enemy
combatant proceedings to meet the special needs of the military
without running afoul of due process requirements. 141 In his
Hamdi dissent, Justice Thomas went so far as to say that the
executive branch has plenary powers to detain enemy
He emphasized the
combatants even without hearings. 142
practical reality that the judiciary did not have the “expertise
and capacity” to second-guess the executive branch’s
determination that an individual required detention. 143 Although
Thomas’s conclusion may be extreme, his argument that “no
governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the

See Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Spitzer, No. 07-Civ.-2935, 2007 WL
4115936, at *17–21 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2007), aff’d sub nom. Mental Hygiene Legal
Servs. v. Paterson, No. 07-Civ-5548, 2009 WL 579445 (2d Cir. 2009).
138
Id. at *17 (alteration in original) (quoting N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.09
(Mckinney 2010)).
139
In particular, the court emphasized the use of the words “offender” and
“recidivist,” concluding that they have “clear criminal implications.” Id. at *19. It
also found that the statute expresses “moral condemnation” that is “normally
reserved for criminal judgments.” Id.
140
Id. at *21.
141
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).
142
Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
143
Id.
137
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Nation” 144 is convincing when grounded in the Supreme Court’s
recognition that the community’s interest in safety can outweigh
an individual’s liberty interest. 145
C. Chances for Release Are Slim
Many argue that civil commitment of sex offenders amounts
to an indefinite confinement. 146 The response from the detainee
cases is that as long as individuals have an adequate basis to
challenge their detention, due process requirements are satisfied.
In New York, as in many other states, confined offenders have a
statutory basis to challenge their detention annually. 147 SOMTA
requires that each individual be examined “at least once every
year” by a state psychiatric examiner. 148 At the same time, the
individual also has “the right to be evaluated by an independent
psychiatric examiner.” 149 In addition, the subject may petition
the court “at any time” for release from a secure facility into
strict and intensive supervision and treatment. 150
Some of the federal statutes and procedures regarding
enemy combatants had similar provisions for periodic review of
an enemy combatant’s status. The DTA was enacted in response
to the Court’s 2004 decision in Hamdi. Congress seemed to be
following the advice of the plurality, who had suggested that an
appropriately authorized, proper military tribunal could meet the
Court’s articulated due process minimums. 151 The DTA required
the Secretary of Defense to submit an annual report to Congress,
detailing its review procedures and the number of detainees
Id. at 580 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)).
See id. at 591 (noting that “the Due Process Clause ‘lays down [no]
categorical imperative’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987))).
146
See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88
VA. L. REV. 1025, 1034 (2002) (“Substantive due process requires a . . . workable
limiting standard to justify the massive deprivation of liberty that indefinite
involuntary civil commitment imposes.”); Edward P. Ra, Note, The Civil
Confinement of Sexual Predators: A Delicate Balance, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 335, 352 (2007) (“Since civil confinement laws involve a deprivation of
liberty for an indefinite period of time, the due process clause protections must be
met.”).
147
See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.09 (McKinney 2010) (annual examinations
and petitions for discharge).
148
Id. § 10.09(b).
149
Id.
150
Id. § 10.09(f).
151
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004).
144
145
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reviewed. 152
The decisions of the CSRTs were explicitly
reviewable by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. 153 In his Boumediene dissent, Chief Justice Roberts
emphasized that the DTA expressly directs the Secretary of
Defense to review any new evidence pertaining to the enemy
combatant status of a detainee. 154 There must be a yearly review
of each prisoner’s status to “afford every detainee the opportunity
‘to explain why he is no longer a threat to the United States.’ ” 155
The Boumediene Court’s problem with the review of new
evidence was that on its face, the DTA did not allow the
reviewing Court of Appeals to consider evidence outside the
CSRT record. 156 Roberts disagreed with this “hand wringing” of
the Court because he found that it declared the evidence issue
unconstitutional with reference only to abstract hypotheticals. 157
It is fair to say that the procedural opportunities for annual
review in SOMTA would fall within the Boumediene Court’s
allowable limits. Once the subject is evaluated by a psychiatric
professional, the report is sent to OMH. 158 If the subject cannot
afford his own evaluator, the court will appoint him one of his
choice. 159 After reviewing the new report, and the rest of the
subject’s file, OMH makes “a determination in writing as to
whether the respondent is currently a dangerous sex offender
requiring confinement.” 160 If the respondent petitions for a
hearing, it is held within forty-five days. If the reviewing court
finds that there is a substantial issue as to whether he still
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 1405(d), 119 Stat.
3136 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., and
42 U.S.C.). Boumediene later held that the Detainee Treatment Act was not an
adequate substitute for habeas, but this was not based on the annual review
procedures alone. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 728–30 (2008).
153
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 803 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
154
Id. at 801 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Today the Court strikes down as
inadequate the most generous set of procedural protections ever afforded aliens
detained by this country as enemy combatants.”).
155
Id. at 821 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723 (2008) (No. 06-1196), 2007 WL 671010).
156
Id. at 789 (majority opinion).
157
Id. at 821–22 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). “The Court’s new method of
constitutional adjudication only underscores its failure to follow our usual
procedures and require petitioners to demonstrate that they have been harmed by
the statute they challenge.” Id. at 821–22.
158
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.09 (McKinney 2010).
159
Id.
160
Id. § 10.09(b) (emphasis added).
152

CP_Alessi (Do Not Delete)

2011]

WHO MAY WE DETAIN AND HOW

7/14/2011 3:56 PM

257

requires confinement, an evidentiary hearing is held. Unlike the
enemy combatant proceedings, where the government’s basis has
a presumption of validity, in this evidentiary hearing, the
Attorney General has the burden of proof. 161 The respondent will
continue to be confined only if the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that he requires it. 162
D. Notice and Opportunity To Be Heard Are Lacking in Certain
Provisions
One of the challenged provisions in SOMTA is section
10.06(f), 163 which authorizes detention of a sexual offender before
the probable cause hearing stage of the commitment proceedings.
In Mental Hygiene Legal Service, 164 Plaintiff Mental Hygiene
Legal Service (“MHLS”) argued that this provision violates the
“most basic tenets of due process”: notice and opportunity to
challenge the detention. 165 The court found that the statute did
not require notice be given to the respondent in advance of his
detention by a securing petition. 166 It also agreed with Plaintiff
MHLS that it gives the individual no opportunity to contest the
petition and thus, detention. 167 Though the court recognized that
this provision might empower an executive branch official to
order an individual detained beyond his sentence, it declined to

Id. § 10.09(d).
Id. § 10.09(h).
163
New York Mental Hygiene Law provides:
[I]f it appears that the respondent may be released prior to the time the
case review team makes a determination, and the attorney general
determines that the protection of public safety so requires, the attorney
general may file a securing petition at any time after [the respondent’s]
receipt of written notice. . . . In such circumstance, there shall be no
probable cause hearing until such time as the case review team may find
that the respondent is a sex offender requiring civil management. If the
case review team determines that the respondent is not a sex offender
requiring civil management, the attorney general shall so advise the court
and the securing petition shall be dismissed.
Id. § 10.06(f).
164
No. 07-Civ-2935, 2007 WL 4115936 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2007), aff’d sub nom.
Mental Hygiene Legal Servs. v. Paterson, No. 07-Civ-5548, 2009 WL 579445 (2d Cir.
2009).
165
Id. at *7, *11 (declining to deem the provision facially unconstitutional). This
case is still being litigated.
166
Id. at *7.
167
Id. at *7–8.
161
162
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declare the provision facially unconstitutional, because “the
present record [did] not demonstrate that the statute cannot be
administered or interpreted in a way to avoid these problems.” 168
Unlike the Guantanamo detainees, many of whom have
faced six years without judicial oversight, 169 the sex offenders
affected by section 10.06(f) will be granted a probable cause
hearing within seventy-two hours of the securing petition. 170 The
court in Mental Hygiene Legal Service also found it relevant that
in the first six months of the statute’s passage, securing petitions
were only used twice. The court took this as an indication that
the Attorney General was not abusing the process. 171
Another potential challenge might arise with regard to notice
under SOMTA. Many of the provisions setting deadlines for the
Attorney General contain an “out” clause. In these instances, the
Attorney General’s failure to give notice within the psrescribed
time does not affect the validity of the notice and also does not
impair any subsequent action. 172 However, the detainee cases
illustrate that so long as an individual has a meaningful
opportunity to be heard, due process requirements are met. With
SOMTA, the respondent is given the opportunity to challenge his
confinement in both the probable cause hearing and the trial. If
the Attorney General’s office abuses its discretion in filing
papers, the judiciary is able to respond and perhaps change its
interpretation the permissive language of the statute.
IV. CONCLUSION
Civil confinement of sex offenders is not without controversy.
As suggested already, the proper scope of the Sex Offender
Management and Treatment Act will be defined in the courts. 173
There must be a careful balancing of interests between the

168
Id. at *10. In explaining the plaintiff’s burden on a facial challenge, the court
declared facial invalidation “an extraordinary remedy” that is “generally disfavored.”
Id. This type of challenge will only succeed if there is “no set of circumstances under
which the challenged practices would be constitutional.” Id.
169
See Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. 723, 729–30 (2008) (finding that the case
for requiring detainees to exhaust administrative review before a habeas corpus
hearing would be “much stronger” if the individuals had only been waiting a short
period of time).
170
See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.06(h) (McKinney 2010).
171
Mental Hygiene Legal Serv., 2007 WL 4115936, at *11.
172
See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 10.05(b), (g), 10.06(a).
173
See Mental Hygiene Legal Serv., 2007 WL 4115936, at *11.
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liberty of the confined individual and the safety of the
community. With recognition of this balance, the Supreme Court
has ruled that civil confinement is constitutional. It did so in the
context of a Kansas statute, similar to the New York Act.
Despite these rulings, the civil confinement issue is still
controversial.
More guidance is necessary to determine whether the New
York statute’s procedures are adequate.
With enemy
combatants, a similar weighing of liberty and safety occurs. The
Supreme Court’s take on enemy combatants illustrates that so
long as the procedures used to accomplish legitimate
governmental goals comport with the minimum floor of due
process, the legislature is free to address the issue as it sees fit.
The government may tailor proceedings to meet unique
circumstances. More specifically, by identifying due process
deficiencies in the enemy combatant procedures, the detainee
cases illustrate what is unacceptable. Challenges to the New
York statute can be met with a thoughtful response from these
detainee cases.
By holding New York’s statute to these
standards, and using the enemy combatant cases as a framework
for analysis, it becomes evident that its established procedures
are constitutional.

